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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, in the wake of the Vietnamese conflict, the
military establishment is faced with continuing reductions
in available manpower and supply support resources. The
reductions cannot be considered as short range difficulties
which will simply "pass if waited out." The tremendous
economic drain brought about by the military build-up during
the Vietnamese conflict is not likely to be forgotten soon,
and closer scrutiny of military efficiency is probable in
the future. In addition to funding reductions, the tech-
nological sophistication incorporated into recently acquired
equipment has increased the marginal cost of procurement and
upkeep. The United States Navy shares this dilemma with
the other military services, and while the dilemma will be
felt by all commands in the Navy, this thesis is concerned
with its effect on the maintenance of naval aircraft.
A result of restricted resources will be fewer aircraft
purchased by the Navy at the same time that aircraft will
require increasingly higher numbers of man-hours per flight-
hour. A paradox is obvious since the military reduction
necessarily means that fewer men will be available to per-
form the increased maintenance tasko One thing seems certain;
the Navy must seek at least the past quality levels of
maintenance performance while receiving reduced levels of
resources with which to do the job.

Optimal maintenance requirements and procedures give
promise of providing at least a partial solution to this
dilemma. Periodic maintenance policy has been lacking in
analytical basis because no formal decision-making logic has
existed to guide management efforts. Therefore, crucial
decisions pertaining to resource allocation have tended to
be based largely on tradition, experience and intuition.
A proposal for improving the inspection requirements
is to implement statistical reliability analysis methodology
in the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP). This
thesis has as its objective to contribute to the reduction
in aircraft maintenance cost by the following:
a. To indicate how statistical reliability analysis
methodology can improve the efficiency of the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program.
b. To indicate how a modified version of the commercial
air carriers program can be implemented in the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program.
c. To indicate how partial implementation of a sta-
tistical reliability based system can be incorporated with
minimal delay.
Unless corrective action is taken, the problem will
come sharply into focus as fewer aircraft are available and
additional "down time" is experienced because personnel to




The determination of specific maintenance tasks to be
performed and the time allowed to elapse between maintenance
actions has evolved in the U. S. Navy by intuition and by
an attitude of "better safe than sorry." The absence of a
driving motivation, such as profit, has tended to negate
innovative action which would bring about significant improve-
ments in efficiency. The interest and the dedication of the
individual managers toward their responsibilities may have
been there, however, the mindset of the Naval aviation com-
munity has been one wherein preventive maintenance has
occupied the highest priority in aircraft maintenance responsi-
bilities. Too little attention has been given to the cost-
effectiveness of the preventive maintenance tasks which
have been required. This is particularly true of maintenance
actions which required the expenditure of only time and
elbow grease.
Accurate documentation of the evolution of the present
aircraft maintenance program in the U. S. Navy is not avail-
able. Certain inferences can be made, however, based upon
the lack of definitive policy in certain areas which have
become evident as a result of this research. Demonstrative
of this, are the general requirements delineated in OPNAVINST
4790.2 series and the applicable NATOPS manuals that Naval
aircraft must undergo a daily preflight inspection, a plane
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captain's preflight inspection, and a pilot's preflight in-
spection prior to the first launch >.of J^hae day. Following
the return from the first flight, and prior to the second,
the aircraft must be postflight inspected by the flight
crew, serviced and preflight inspected by the plane captain,
and then preflight inspected by a pilot again. This cycle
continues until the last sortie of the day, and begins anew
the next day with the daily inspection. There should be
a realization that the U. S. Navy neither gets nor expects
to get 100$ reliability as a result of these repetitive main-
tenance actions. Simple conditional probability computations
show that in the absence of 100$ reliability on every inspec-
tion, the probability of a malfunction decreases with each
successive inspection without reliability ever reaching 100$.
The question then becomes, "At what percent reliability
are maintenance managers expected to stop requiring additional
preflight inspections prior to launch?" Herein lies the
aforementioned omission. Realizing that 100$ reliability
is impossible to attain, and given the present state-of-
the-art of aircraft design, what guidelines, what organiza-
tional policies, or what efficiency goals are expected of
the organizational maintenance managers?
Reliability Factor may be computed as follows:
Reliability Factor = P( Inspector A finds discrepancy) + P(In-
spector B finds discrepancy given Inspector A missed discrepancy)
+ . . . + P(Inspector N finds discrepancy given Inspectors A
through N-l missed discrepancy)
.

Recent efforts to improve the effectiveness of the NAMP
have short-range objectives, and therefore are not providing
the necessary changes in resource allocation. The most
sweeping example, which applies to all aircraft models, is
the concept of phased maintenance. This concept is, in
reality, the old "calendar check" revised to be performed on
a utilization basis rather than calendar time and split up
to be required at equidistant flight-hour intervals. Imple-
menting this program has accomplished two objectives which
were published in Ref . 1. They are:
1. Reduced, cannibalization, and
2. Reduced NORM time for scheduled maintenance.
The reduction in cannibalization has proved to be very
effective in that it eliminates the need to "rob Peter to
pay Paul," and is directly precipitated from the shorter
turn-around time required for phased maintenance.
Major inspections performed in a block result in a
large percentage of the total maintenance for an aircraft
being performed in lengthy hangar periods, while in phased
maintenance most of the work is divided into small packages
which may be done during a 24-hour hangar period.
The second objective must be viewed as short-range in
that it does not necessarily reflect a reduction in the Not
Operationally Ready, Maintenance (NORM) time for extended
periods of time. Undesirable maintenance tasks, as defined
by MSG-TI , are still required wherever they existed previously.
The frequency of maintenance tasks under the phased
10

maintenance concept remains essentially unchanged from the
calendar requirements; only the simultaneousness of tasks
has been altered.
Due to the time constraint of this study, the feasibility
of searching out all of the problem areas pertaining to each
aircraft was precluded. General research into the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Program has persuaded the authors that
omissions and short-range objectives occur throughout the
entire spectrum of Navy maintenance tasks. This may be easily
demonstrated at the opposite end of the spectrum from the
preflight inspections by evaluating depot level decision
logic. The question is one concerning the criteria used to
establish depot level maintenance intervals. One would
normally expect that this information was initially gleaned
from manufacturers' specifications, and that usage data was
employed for subsequent periodicity. Unfortunately, this
has not been the case. Depot level maintenance intervals
are generally based upon "experienced judgement" more than
any other input* The vendors' role has historically been one
of passive agreement that overhaul at the Navy's recommended
interval should not cause their product to be less satis-
factory to the Navy. The "experienced judgement" demonstrated
by Naval Personnel has been based on such parameters as the
interval used for the previous generation's aircraft. For
instance, the starting point for setting the depot level
maintenance interval for the P-3 aircraft was automatically
that of the P-2 even though no overhaul interval was
11

recommended by the vendor for commercial utilization of
the P-3. "
This judgement can be proved to be effective if viewed
only from the perspective of ability to continue to operate
aircraft over their expected service lives, and the ability
to sustain an aviation safety record that has been acceptable.
It has provided little, if any, insight into the problem of
how much service life is forfeited or how better the safety
record could have been, had it not been influenced by an
infant mortality rate generated by over-maintaining the air-
craft. Expenditure of consumables and human resources have
been considered even less than the forfeitures in service
life and safety.
Another excellent example of basing maintenance require-
ments for one aircraft on another may be seen by examining
the proposed flying hour interval between depot level main-
tenance on Naval helicopters. Refer to Table 1. Note that
all but two helicopters have 1000 hour intervals. The TH-57A
has a 2400 hour interval and is to be inspected under a
commercial contract. Other considerations, such as commercial
supply support contracts, all but remove Naval discretion to
deviate from this aircraft's maintenance interval. The other
aircraft which deviates from the 1000 hour interval is the
TH-1L , which has a 1500 hour inspection interval. Research
reveals that this 50 percent increase in tour length over
the UK-1L and UH-1E can easily be computed by multiplying
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THIS COMPARISON OF NAVAL HELICOPTER PDLM INTER-
VALS HIGHLIGHTS THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY IN THE
ASSIGNMENT OF MAINTENANCE INTERVALS, WHILE THE
UH-lE, UH-lL, TH-lL AND HH-lK AIRCRAFT ALL HAVE
THE SAME PHASED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS, SAME
STRUCTURALLY OR MAINTENANCE S IGN I c I CANT ITEMS,
AND OPERATE IN THE SAME ENVIRONMENT, ONLY THE
TH-lL HAS AN EXTENDED INTERVAL, THE SATISFACT-
ORY OPERATION OF THE TH~lL, WITH LESS MAINTEN-
ANCE, INDICATES THAT THE OTHER MODELS ARE
BEING OVERMAINTAINED, SOURCE: REF.2, P.A-M.
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rounding it off to the nearest 500 hours. The glaring dis-
crepancy in this instance is that the UH-lL*s and some UH-lE*s
have been assigned to the aviation helicopter training command
to augment the TH-lL*s. The three models of aircraft all
have the same maintenance significant and structurally signif-
icant items, yet the TH-1L model is allowed 50 percent more
utilization than its counterpart, performing the same mission,
and in the same environment. Additionally, the existing
phased maintenance requirement cards, NAVAIR 01-110HCA-6-4,
enumerate identical inspections for the four H-l models
presently in Naval use.
Changes to the NAMP occur frequently, but are generally
examples of crisis management and seldom address the basic
thought process which may have generated the crisis originally.
An example of this type of program modification is the
process called Aircraft Conditional Evaluation (ACE).
ACE was implemented in late 1972 and was designed to
provide evidence which would justify extended intervals
between Periodic Depu^ Level Maintenance (PDLM) . The need
to extend the scheduled intervals unfortunately was not the
result of planned maintenance improvements, but was generated
by an increasing backlog of aircraft awaiting induction into
the Naval Aircraft Rework Facilities (NARF's).
The concept of ACE is straightforward since the basic
idea is to prevent an aircraft from undergoing rework if
its material condition is acceptable for continued safe
operation. The concept, in itself, is a significant improvement
14

over the prior procedure of merely inducting the plane into
overhaul at scheduled intervals regardless of material con-
dition. However, the proposed flight hour sensitive program
is simply the old calendar interval translated to a rounded-
off aircraft utilization figure. The stopgap nature of this
innovation becomes apparent under further analysis. The
following scenario, which is an actual case cited in Ref. 2,
(p. D-l), will illustrate that nature.
Nine F-4J fighter aircraft from two Miramar-based
squadrons were inspected in accordance with the ACE program'
in December, 1972. All aircraft had just returned from an
extended deployment aboard the U. S. S. Kitty Hawk and were
at, or very near to, their end-of-tour dates. Eight of
the nine aircraft were recommended for and received an 18
month extension following the inspection by a NARF field
team. (The inspection team spent about 300 manhours giving
each plane an in-depth ACE inspection.)
Since the rework interval for the F-4J is 30 months,
the intuitive reaction to the extensions should have been
surprise in that following ext ended operations in a very
demanding maritime environment, 88.9^ of the aircraft in-
spected were deemed reliable enough to warrant a. 60$ exten-
sion in service life. Surprise was not the reaction, however,
because those managers who were involved with this project
were not simply taking a wild guess or hoping for the best;
they were in fact expecting to find that at least a
15

significant number of the inspected aircraft could be extended,
yet the PDLM interval remains the same.
ACE inspections are still held at scheduled PDLM intervals,
and extensions are expected and continue to be authorized be-
cause the empirical data generated by this sampling cannot
be employed in a system which is not committed to statistical
reliability.
Reference 2 is a recently completed study of the Center
for Naval Analyses concerning the depot level maintenance
program of the Navy. The study strongly recommends the
utilization of a statistical reliability based concept to
replace the historical use of experienced judgement. Depot
level maintenance is covered thoroughly in the study and
it provides additional examples involving the A-7B and F-4B
aircraft. It is mentioned here to provide the reader with
direction into that area Q
A general aspect of the NAMP which has become more
questionable as a result of research is that which employs
the continual monitoring technique. An example is the spectro-
graph^ oil analysis program. At the time of its inception,
this program at least had the potential of being an effective
forecasting device. No actual result data exists to back
up the theoretical potential, yet the program continues.
Reference 3 revealed that United Airlines abandoned a similar
program because the statistical data did not confirm the
reliability or economics of spectrographic analysis.
16

The fluid contamination analysis program, while somewhat
analogous to the spectrographic process above, is different
in that the contaminants do not necessarily reflect a structural
breakdown. For example, hydraulic fluid can easily become
discolored from carbon due to the passage of the hot fluid
through a black hose. If the physical size of the particulate
carbon is not sufficient to allow the filter to remove the
contamination and the particulate matter is injurious to
the hydraulic system, then continuous monitoring and changing
of the fluid is probably not the best answer. It would
seem intuitive to incorporate a more efficient filter or
remove the source of the carbon rather than to continue to
expend resources indefinitely. On the other hand, if analysis
shows that the contamination is not injurious to the
hydraulic system, further maintenance action is simply not
desired.
Another requirement , less important from a cost stand-
point but which is indicative of inefficient allocation of
manpower, is bhe recording of counting accelerometer readings
installed in high performance aircraft. Reference 4 (p. 12)
revealed that nearly 70 percent of the accelerorneters were
found to be in need of calibration or repair, or both, during
periodic checks. If the data being collected is that un-
reliable, then obviously it provides a poor basis for
scheduling additional maintenance actions.
17

B. STATISTICAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
To fully understand the ccmcc^'-of the statistical
reliability based maintenance program, certain properties
of reliability must be recognized. One of the most basic
characteristics is the effect of time upon reliability,.
To insure that the reader is cognizant of the various aspects
of this phenomenon, a brief discussion of the age-reliability
relationship follows.
It is generally accepted that all mechanical devices
deteriorate with age. As an aircraft component ages, the
probability of failure increases. The increase continues
until a point is reached where a 100 percent failure
probability exists. As intuitive as this may seem, failure
to recognize the relevance of how reliability changes with
age and when it changes is a critical omission in the
thinking of many managers.
The time-based bathtub curve, Figure 1, from Ref. 5
(p. 5.4.4), has almost universal applicability to the analysis
of age vis-a-vis reliability. Early in the operating life
of a component, in the period known as break-in or burn-in,
there is a time during which the probability of failure
is very high. This is the area of infant mortality, region
I. The high failure rate may be caused by several factors,
such as inherent material defect, design deficiency, or
improper maintenance.
The next consecutive area, region II, is a relatively
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of failure. It is this long period of high reliability and
satisfactory operation which represents the productive
life of the component. The final portion of the curve,
region III, is one of rapidly increasing probability of
failure.
The reality of aircraft maintenance is that all air-
craft components progress through the three regions depicted
in Figure 1. Realization of the implications of this graph
are absolutely essential to the planning of a logical,
efficient maintenance program. Keeping in mind that the
time span for each region and the respective slopes of the
curve will vary with various aircraft components, three
categorical statements may be made of age-reliability
effects:
1. If one removes, replaces, or performs scheduled
maintenance on an item which is operating satisfactorily in
region I, the result will be a decrease in the reliability
of that item. This is true because the new or recently
maintained paro must be&in the infant mortality stage over
again, at. a point higher on the probability of failure curve.
2. If a satisfactorily operating part is removed,
replaced or given scheduled maintenance in region II, there
will be a reduction in reliability, for the same reason as
stated in (l) above. The replacement or maintenance process,




3. If the component exhibits the behavior of region
III early enough in its service life, so that large numbers
of these components survive to that time, then—and only-
then—can it be rational to remove, replace, or perform
scheduled maintenance on that item.
In the early I960 *s, commercial air carriers found that
they owned and operated aircraft which were becoming prohibi-
tively expensive to maintain. The problem of increasing
maintenance costs became even more significant with the
development by Boeing Aircraft Corporation of the B-747.
The sheer economics of holding a large expensive airplane
on the ground for routine maintenance work caused the air-
line maintenance managers to develop a maintenance program
based not only on dependable quality, but also on the effec-
tive use of resources. The outgrowth of the efforts of the
commercial air carriers was a maintenance program planning
document called MSG-I. When MSG-I was completed in 1968, it
was the first statistical reliability analysis (SRA) concept
to provide a decisicn logic which could determine what main-
tenance was to be performed and at what intervals it would
be accomplished.
The success of the program and the advent of additional
wide-bodied jet airliners created the need for a more general
maintenance planning scheme. MSG-I was then refined, through
the joint efforts of the commercial air carriers and the Air
Transport Association, into a program applicable to all
aircraft and was based upon the following presuppositions:
21

Maintenance tasks are desirable only if:
1. Failure of a component adversely affects operating
safety, or
2. It is more economical to replace or repair that
part prior to failure than at failure, and
3. Statement 1 or 2 is true and the item has an adverse
age-reliability relationship.
The refined logic, designated MSG-II and outlined in Ref. 6
is an SRA concept and is very effective and highly productive
for the airline companies.
The problems encountered by the commercial carriers
in the area of economy of maintenance are becoming more
applicable to the operations of the U. S. Navy as available
labor and consumable resources become less plentiful. Efforts
to improve the efficiency as well as the quality of aircraft
maintenance in the U. S. Navy are well-documented in numerous
studies and directives. These efforts include preparation
to implement the MSG-II concept into the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program as will be discussed in the next section
of this paper.
C. MSG-II
As the commercial air carriers focused their attention
on the need to improve the economic efficiency of their
maintenance programs, the phenomena illustrated in Figure 1
became increasingly important, i. e., if scheduled maintenance




then manhours and supply support were at least twice as
expensive as necessary. Proportional savings could be attained
by statistically computing the optimum intervals and by
adjusting scheduled maintenance tasks accordingly.
Another realization to evolve from this type of analysis
was the effect of scheduled maintenance actions on items
which did not demonstrate an adverse age-reliability relation-
ship. An investigation of components which demonstrate a
random failure rate as compared to those which experience
failure as a function of age was made by representatives of
the air carriers and manufacturers while developing the MSG-II
concept. The findings of this group were reported in Ref.
6 (para. 2.3.12) as follows:
It has been found that overall measures of reliability
of complex components, such as the premature removal rate,
usually are not functions of the age of these components
... In this event, scheduled overhaul cannot improve
the operating reliability. Engineering action (redesign)
is the only means of improving reliability. These com-
ponents should be operated, therefore, without scheduled
overhaul. Note: Systems or items which require no
scheduled task are included in condition monitoring.
Some items dc , however, she.'; very definite relationships
between age and reliability. Analysis of these items show
that resistance to failure decreases with age although the
stress applied to the equipment remains approximately evenly
distributed throughout the expected life-cycle of the com-
ponent. A pictorial description of the resistance/stress/age
relationship is provided in Figure 2 which v/as extracted
from Ref. 7 (p. 12). It should be recognized that Figure 2
represents the graphic inverse of stages II and III of
23

Figure 1. (The authors reiterate that the slope of the
resistance curve is a function ^f t^_ :' /dividual component
being analyzed and is shown here for visual demonstration
only.)
The purpose of the airline/manufacturers' maintenance
planning document is to maintain the inherent design level
of operating safety. The key word in this phrase is inherent.
There is NO maintenance action which will increase operating
safety beyond that which the design itself affords. Implicit
in this stated purpose is the maintenance of those levels as
efficiently as possible, and is manifested in the abolition
of maintenance tasks which neither improve the reliability
of items whose failure would adversely affect operating
safety nor are more economical to replace prior to failure.
The MSG-II decision logic is based upon the identification
of all items judged by the manufacturer to be most important
from a safety or economic standpoint, their modes of failure,
and their probability of failure. Once the identification
process nas oeen accomplished, a liso of maintenance tasks
which could restore the original reliability is enumerated.
After determining what can be done, the next logical step
is to determine what must be done to preclude failure which
would adversely affect operational safety. The final deter-
mination concerns what maintenance actions should be
accomplished for economic reasons, e. g., actual failure
could result in damage to other components and/or signifi-
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Figure 3 provides a diagrammatical view of the decision
tree suggested by the MSG-II for system and component analysis.
Five questions must be answered for each component analyzed.
Questions (a), (b) and (c) must be answered for each failure
mode
,
question (d) for each function and question (e) for the
item as a whole The questions are listed below:
(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
routine flight crew monitoring?
(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by
in situ maintenance or unit test?
(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect
upon operations safety?
(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the
flight crew?
(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and
reliability?
Reliability analysis enters into all three types of
maintenance in use in MSG-II: hard-time, on-condition, and
condition monitoring. The latter two types allow the reduction
of preventive maintenance by repairing most parts only when
failure or incipient failure is detected. If the failure
rate or unscheduled removal rate of a particular component
exceeds an allowable level, a corrective engineering change
can be initiated. Repeat component failures, which keep
recurring after apparent repairs have been make, can be
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failure can be diagnosed and further costly and unnecessary-
maintenance may be prevented.
Hard-time control and on-condition maintenance have in
the past been the usual procedures for keeping critical items
in satisfactory condition. Hard-time control requires that
a component be overhauled after a preset usage period regardless
of the item's condition and assumes that an adverse age-
reliability relationship exists. Reliability analysis has
shown that this is not the case for the majority of aircraft
components and that hard-time removals result in the unnecessary
maintenance of many perfectly functioning aircraft parts.
On-condition maintenance requires tests of components
at regular intervals. These checks are made with the item
either removed or installed on the aircraft. If the item
meets all performance standards it remains in operation until
the next test.
Condition monitoring became practical with the numerous
redundant systems of modern aircraft which allow many critical
components to remain in operation until deterioration be-
comes detectable. Statistical analysis of the performance
data of the items and systems must be performed to anticipate
degradation and remove the part in question or alter the
maintenance program of that item itself.
The three aspect maintenance system facilitates trend
analysis of failures thereby making it easier to plan and
control maintenance resources. Resources are allocated
assuming a particular level of component reliability.
23

If the removal rate either increases or decreases substan-
tially, the impact on the aircraft maintenance facilities
will require reallocation of these resources.
The results attained by the commercial air carriers*
implementation of a statistical reliability concept are
very impressive. Reference 7 (p. 7) lists some of these
important results, two of which are:
• • • we now have a logical process for designing safe,
effective maintenance programs for transport airplanes
—
even though they may not yet have been flown ... Some
insight of the value of this process can be seen from
the fact that while the initial maintenance program for
the DC-8 specified time-limited overhauls for about 300
units, the initial program for the 747 and DC-10 specified
less than 10 items. The in-service reliability of the
747, the first airplane having its maintenance program
determined wholly by the decision tree process I have
described (KSG-II) is powerful evidence of the validity
of this innovative technique ...
... we have eliminated the requirement for time-
limited overhaul for jet engines ...
Reference 2 (p. 42) shows that the cost of operating
a Boeing 707 decreased by $6.05 per flight hour between 1963
and 1971. This reduction is measured in current dollars and
occurred despite rising labor and material costs. This
cost decline is especially significant when multiplied by
the thousands of 707 flight hours flown by the major airlines
each year. During the same period, the accident and fatality
rates also declined.
Table 2, from Ref. 2 (p. 43), shows the percent of




PERCENT OF fc*Rt4N€fi COMPONENTS
IN THE VARIOUS
MAINTENANCE CLASSES
HARD TIME ON CONDITION
or
COND. MONITOR
Original Current Original Current
707/720 99 40 1 60
727 55.5 40 44.5 60
737 53 29 47 71
747 -- 0.3 -- 99.7
DC-IO — 2 •• mm 98
L- 1 01
1
— 2 -- 98
THIS TABLE SHOWS THE RESULTS OF A RIGOROUS AND
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY CONCEPTS
TO MODERN JET AIRLINERS, THE REDUCTION IN HARD
TIME COMPONENTS HAS THE RESULT OF GREATLY IMPROVING
OPERATIONAL READINESS WHILE EXTENSIVELY REDUCING
MAINTENANCE TIME AND LABOR COST,
SOURCE: REF, 2, P, A3.
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contrasts the original percentages on those aircraft which
were placed on the MSG-II concept retroactively.
It becomes quite evident from Table 2 that the airlines
were overmaintaining their aircraft originally, but have been
able to greatly improve their resource allocation by incor-
porating the MSG-II decision logic. Hard time items have
decreased tremendously while on-condition and condition moni-
tored items have increased.
D. TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF MSG-II
The Department of Defense has been the recipient of
mounting pressure from the General Accounting Office (GAO)
to eliminate wasteful or inefficient practices. Emanating
from these efforts by the GAO have been numerous revisions
to the NAMP, some of which employ the techniques of statistical
reliability analysis.
The most advanced application of SRA in the NAMP is in
the P-3 community where the Improved Maintenance Program (IMP)
is the operational reality of a contract between the U. S.
Navy and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, manufacturer of
the P-3 aircraft, wherein Lockheed designed an SRA based
maintenance program for the P-3. The consulting services
of the Director of Maintenance Analysis of United Airlines
was secured to direct and/or assist in the formulation of
the program.
Reference 8, in August 1973, tasked Patrol Squadron 40
to initiate IMP and to determine its applicability to the
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Navy's operating environment. Periodic progress reports
were submitted to the Commander of Patrol Wings, Pacific
Fleet. Based upon the results of the evaluation as recorded
in the progress reports, Ref. 9 provided authority for
Patrol Squadron 40 to continue under the IMP indefinitely.
All P-3 squadrons in the Pacific Fleet are now operating
under the IMP.
The results of the evaluation performed by Patrol
Squadron 40 are available in toto in References 1, 10, 11,
12 and 13. Tables 3 and 4, based on 13 months' data, provide
a very impressive example of the improvements in efficiency
and savings made possible by a complete SRA aircraft main-
tenance plan.
In addition to the IMP in use among the Pacific Fleet
patrol squadrons, a contract has been awarded to United Air-
lines to develop a depot level maintenance program for the
F-4J fighter aircraft. Concurrently, Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation has been tasked to produce an SRA based organiza-
tional level program for the 3-3A while IIARF Alameda has
been given the assignment to develop a similar program for
the depot level inspection of the same aircraft. The lack
of definitive direction in the total maintenance effort is
obviated by the omission of an organizational SRA program
for the F-4 aircraft.
In view of the enthusiasm and support given to the pro-








Average Down-time for 18
Calendar Inspections 15 days/inspection
2 Calendar Insp/year X
15.3 days/Inspection 30 days/Acfj/year
IMPROVED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
Average Down-time for 46
Phase Inspections 1.7 days/Phase




In percentage 77. 8 %
THIS TABLE COMPARES THE AVERAGE OUT-OF-SERVI CE
TIMES FOR P-3 AIRCRAFT IN THE IMPROVED MAIN-
TENANCE PROGRAM (IMP J AS OPPOSED TO THE PREVIOUS
CALENDAR METHOD OF AIRCRAFT INSPECTIONS, THE
PERCENTAGE SAVINGS OF THE IMP DEMONSTRATE A
DISTINCT ADVANTAGE OVER THE ISOCHRONIC METHOD
AFTER ONLY .D MONTHS USE,








hours/ Calendar Inspection 354.8 MH/lnspection
2 Calendar Insp/year X 9
Aircraft X 354.8 MH/lnsp 6395.4 MH/year
IMPROVED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
Average Maintenance Man-
hours/ Phase Inspection H5.8 MH/Phase
4 Phases/year X 9
Aircraft X 115.8 MH/Phase 4268.8 MH/year
SAVINGS
In Man-hours/year 2126.6
In percentage 4 9.9 %
THIS TABLE COMPARES THE LABOR ASPECTS OF A
TIME-PHASED SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE PLAN (IMP)
VERSUS THOSE OF THE PREVIOUS CALENDAR SYSTEM,
THIS DATA REPRESENTS ONLY 13 MONTHS' UTIL-
IZATION OF THE IMP BUT ALREADY ILLUSTRATES
ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN REDUCING THE MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS OF A P"3 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON.
SOURCE: REF, 1, (P.l OF ENCLOSURE 1)
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the Naval Air Systems Command to broaden the application
of SRA to other aircraft, at least tacit approval of the
concepts and techniques of the MSG-II by the managers of
the NAMP is obvious.
E. SUMMARY
The decision process utilized by the U. S. Navy con-
cerning aircraft maintenance tasks has been satisfactory in
the past, perhaps because manpower has been abundant and
Congressional appropriations have been relatively high.
The inadequacies of the present system cannot continue
to be tolerated now that improved managerial techniques are
available and recognized . More maintenance requirements are
not necessarily better, and historical procedures have not
necessarily generated the proper data with which to forecast
maintenance requirements for new equipment. The decision
logic of the MSG-II enables Navy maintenance managers to
replace much of the subjective evaluation extant in the present
system with quantifiable judgement based upon the empirical
data available through statistical reliability analysis.
Reference 9 authorized indefinite continuation of the
Improved Maintenance Program in the Pacific Fleet patrol
community, and occasional attempts have subsequently been
initiated in other communities in a random manner. The lack
of top level commitment to an overall concentrated effort
to incorporate the improved methodology has resulted in a
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slow transition to SRA and is costing the Navy in excess of
$300 million annually.
The Enlisted Requirements Plan of 1 October 1974 shows
an allowance for 62,074 Group IX (Aviation) ratings. (The
figure excludes non-maintenance Air Controlmen, Aerographers,
Photo Intelligence Technicians, and non-rated strikers.)
Using the Naval Air Systems Command estimating figure
from Ref . 14 of $10.00 cost per maintenance man-hour X 8
hours per day X 5 days per week X 4$ weeks per year X 62,074
maintenance personnel, the total cost for aviation maintenance
labor is $1,191,820,800 per annum. A 26 percent savings in
labor cost would exceed the estimated $300 million—and the
only community fully utilizing the SRA concept reported a
36 percent savings the first year!
As cutbacks in Congressional funding and manning levels
have already demonstrated, improved managerial techniques
and procedures to reduce waste and inefficiency are absolutely
essential if Naval commitments of the future are to be met.
Concern for the efficient employment of available maintenance
resources must become more prevalent at all levels of planning
and operations. Existing maintenance practices and decision
logic must be re-evaluated to ascertain their applicability
to the imminent austerity faced by the U. S. Navy.
The potential for conserving resources resulting from
implementation of an SRA concept is present at every level
of maintenance supervision within the Navy, and therefore
impossible to enumerate in this study. It is possible
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however, to direct the reader's attention to several of
the more obvious savings which by themselves are convincing
enough to warrant adoption of statistical reliability analysis
techniques. They are:
1. Since the total number of aircraft procured includes
some percentage of overbuy to maintain the necessary comple-
ment while some are undergoing Periodic Depot Level Main-
tenance (PDLM) , longer service tours based upon empirical
data generated by SRA would indicate a corresponding decrease
in the overbuy percentage. This overbuy is addressed in
the study by the Center of Naval Analyses (Ref. 2, p. F-7)
,
and is assigned a value of approximately 15 percent.
Obviously, all overbuy requirements cannot be eliminated.
However, every source researched for this paper states that
periodic depot level maintenance is performed too frequently.
Reference 15 (p. 11), in discussing the F-4 aircraft,
states "... the data that we analyzed suggest that the
current 24 month full IRAN (U. S. A. F. equivalent of PDLM)
interval can be conservatively extended up to 4$ months."
Reference 1 (p. 2), shov/s a 79.1 percent reduction in
downtime resulting from the incorporation of an SRA. The
crux of the above discussion is that by utilizing modern
management techniques in the F—14 procurement program,
the U. S. Navy could realize at least a savings of 50 percent
of the overbuy cost associated with the F-14. If that
figure is introduced into the F-14 program to estimate
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possible savings in initial procurement, the computations
of table 5 result.
..,.,,,.,....
2. By continuing components in service until failure
(on condition maintenance) fewer consumables such as filters,
O-rings, nuts and bolts, etc. would be required for any
scheduled maintenance. Even a 25 percent savings, which is
a highly conservative estimate of the potential of this
program, could easily exceed 1 percent of the aircraft main-
tenance budget, or about $10 million annually.
3. This paper is primarily directed at man-hour savings.
Probable savings can be expected to exceed 35 percent of the
current anticipated maintenance effort, and simultaneously
maintain existing safety standards—if not exceed them.
Reference 1 (p. 1 of enclosure 1), shows that Patrol Squadron
40 experienced a 36 percent reduction in required man-hours
during the first year after shifting to the SRA maintenance
program. This reduction represents a $2,255 million annual
savings by the P-3 community alone.
The decision logic provided by the statistical reliability
analysis of the MSG-II does not constitute a panacea for
the problems of resource allocation. It does supply a
much needed and much . improved methodology with which to
attain the efficiency goals of an organization while




SAVINGS IN F-14 PROCUREMENT
THROUGH REDUCTION IN
INITIAL PROCUREMENT
TOTAL AIRCRAFT PURCHASE 334 Aircraft
COST- Airframes plus spares $4.86 Billion
OVERBUY FACTOR 15 %
COST PER AIRCRAFT •
§4.86B -r 334 = $14.55 Million
QUANTITY OF OVERBUY
334 X 15 % = 50.1 Aircraft
COST OF OVERBUY
50.1 X § I4.55M * $ 728.96 Million
SAVINGS
5 % X $72 8,96 M = $ 364.48 Million
THIS TABLE ILLUSTRATES THE POSSIBLE
ICAL RELIABILITY ANALYSES PRIOR TO
CUREMENT. SINCE FEWER AIRCRAFT ARE
POT MAINTENANCE, FEWER AIRCRAFT ARE
SAVINGS FROM STATIST-
INITIAL AIRCRAFT PRO-
OUT OF SERVICE FOR DE-
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
COMBAT READINESS . SOURCE: REF. 2, 3 .F-7 AND REF. 16.
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No prudent manager and certainly not the authors of
this paper desire to lower the probability of safe flight.
Conversely, the intent is to improve safety wherever possible,
but to simultaneously remove the guise of safety which is
frequently used to prevent innovation and explain away in-
efficiency. Critical analysis of the Naval Aviation Main-
tenance Program must be accomplished if efficient planning
is to be obtained. The authors define efficient planning
as reducing (wherever possible) the required flight operations
in Region I of Figure 1, the infant mortality range, and
increasing the opportunity of operations in Region II, the
time of nearly constant resistance to failure. This can
be accomplished by avoiding overmaintenance through the
application of empirical data which presently is available
or can be obtained. Figure 4 represents an effective periodic
maintenance program when the maintenance action is taken at
some point where the probability of catastrophic failure
has become unacceptable . . . then and only then is main-
tenance action desirable.
In order to achieve more efficient management in the
Navy maintenance program the following conclusions and
recommendations are submitted:
1. Conclusion . The Navy is presently operating its
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to rectify the situation is available within the Naval
organization.
Recommendation . The U. S. Navy should officially adopt
a statistical reliability based system for all types of air-
craft to establish maintenance requirements and intervals.
Adoption of such a program has the potential to reduce labor
costs by over $300 million annually plus the savings which
could be realized by the reduction in inputs to the NARF's
plus the savings which could be realized by the reduction
in the percentage of overbuy in procurement.
2. Conclusion . Statistical reliability analysis con-
cepts and decision-logic are not general knowledge through-
out the spectrum of Naval management today; this situation
is incompatible with the proposed change to a SRA based
system.
Recommendation . Expand the present workshop programs
similar to the seminars conducted by Aero Data Inc. and
embodied in Ref. 5. While the motivation of Naval managers
is noXj questioned, the educational background must not be
lacking in exposure to what is considered to be the state-
of-the-art in managerial techniques. The diversity of
education existing in middle and upper management levels
of the U. S. Navy today does not always provide the necessary
basis for this cognition. This academic effort will ensure
the complete understanding of organizational goals and the
policies to be followed in the achievement of those goals.
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3. Conclusion . The decision logic of the MSG-II
should be modified to eliminate some unnecessary steps.
The decision tree shown in Figure 3 requires the analysis of
each component failure mode and what maintenance action
could be taken to restore the item's inherent reliability.
The authors feel (and the authors of Ref. 2 concur) that it
is of no benefit to list all possible maintenance actions
for each failure mode when in most cases the component in
question has no bearing on safety-of-flight or economics.
If maintenance actions do not improve safety reliability
and do not conserve resources, it should not be accomplished
regardless of its effect on the reliability of that item.
Recommendation . Modify the decision logic depicted in
Figure 3 to reflect the logic shown in Figure 5. The devia-
tion from the original is incorporated to eliminate the
aforementioned superfluousness. This is accomplished by
simply first asking whether or not the component affects
operational safety or economics. If the answer is yes, then
possible maintenance actions which could restore the com-
ponent's resistance to failure are listed. If the answer is
no, then the component automatically becomes a "condition-
monitored" item and no further action is necessary.
The benefit of incorporating this recommendation is,
of course, to simplify the decision tree process and there-
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4. Conclusion . The necessity for improved resource
allocation in the U. S. Navy has reached proportions which
demand immediate action at all strata of Naval management.
Reduced manning levels of the operating forces and austere
funding for supply support threaten the Navy's capability
to perform its numerous military commitments.
Due to the time requirements for gathering all of the
pertinent data, full implementation of MSG-II concepts or
any similar decision logic will require several years.
Statistical reliability analysis does not have to be considered
to be a zero-sum concept. It may be incorporated in logical
steps over a period of time, as suggested in the following
recommendation.
Recommendation . Apply the decision logic of Figure 5
to all presently extant scheduled maintenance requirements.
If the answers to questions A, B and C are no, then any
maintenance task is undesirable. If the answer to questions
A, B or C is yes and the answer to question D is no, then the
component is placed in the on-condition category or requires
redesign consideration,:, The application of the revised
MSG-II decision logic can be successful up to this point with
minimal delay e There remains only one additional possible
outcome which has not been satisfied. That eventuality occurs
when the answer to question A, B or C is yes and the answer
to question D is yes. The Navy does not have, at the present
time, the statistical data base required to compute the hard
45

time removal intervals. However, the Navy does have existing
hard time removal intervals which could continue to be used
until the empirical data is accumulated and more accurate
intervals computed.
This partial implementation of a statistical reliability
based system will provide immediate improvements in the
allocation of financial and labor resources by eliminating
the undesirable expenditure of man-hours and the unnecessary
use of consumables.
The statistics generated by the airlines (Ref. 6 and
Ref. 7) and Patrol Squadron 40 (Refs. 10, 11, 12, 13) indicate
that components which require hard time removal total less
than 10 percent of the items analyzed. If this trend holds
in the application to all Naval aircraft, a man-hour savings
of 20 to 25 percent is more than reasonable to expect due
to the increasing number of items moving from the on-condition





ACE . Aircraft Condition Inspection.
Aircraft Utilization . The average daily flying hours for
~ one aircraft. It is computed by dividing the total
flying hours accumulated by a group of identical air-
craft in a reporting period by the number of in-service
• aircraft days during the same period. Utilization may
also be expressed in flying hours per month or per
year.
Availability . Applies to flyable aircraft in such material
condition to be safely capable of normal flight
operations.
Calibration . The application of a known and accurately
measured input to insure that an item will produce
specifically known output which is accurately measured
or indicated.
Cannibalization . The maintenance convenient removal of
serviceable parts from one aircraft or equipment for
installation in another aircraft or equipment.
Component . Any part, combination of parts, subassemblies,
or units which perform a distinct function necessary
to the operation of an aircraft system.
Concept, maintenance . Management ideas and principles which
are studied and then developed into a specific, logical
plan for application through a particular maintenance
program.
Condition Monitoring . Non-preventive maintenance process
wnerein lailures are allowed to occur and which relies
upon analysis of operating data on the whole population
of specified items to indicate whether some allocation
of technical resources is required. Failure modes of
condition monitored items do not have a direct adverse
effect on operating safety. (Also known as "fly to
failure.'*)
Consumable. An item which, after use, cannot be economically
restored to a serviceable condition and loses its iden-
tity as a spare part.
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Downtime . The time that an aircraft is on the ground out of
service.
Experienced Judgement . Judgement based upon professional
experience. It normally includes a very subjective
conservatism such as, "This type of equipment has opera-
ted successfully for X number of hours in the past, but
to be on the safe side, let's start with X-Y hours for
the maintenance interval in this new item."
Hard Time . A primary maintenance process referring to the
scheduled removal or maintenance of an item when the
probability of failure begins to increase rapidly.
The item must adversely affect safety or be more
economical to replace prior to failure, and have an
adverse age-reliability relationship.
Hidden Function . A component has a hidden function if
1. it is normally active but there is no indication
to the flight crew when it fails, or 2. the component
is normally inactive and there is no prior indication
to the flight crew that the function will not perform
when called upon. All components with hidden functions
require some form of scheduled maintenance to be
performed on them.
IMPe Improved Maintenance Program.
Infant Mortality . .That high rate of failure which is signif-
icant during the early age of a component or assembly.
Inherent Level of Reliability and Safety . The highest level
of reliability and safety which is built into, and can
be expected from, a unit, system or aircraft and is
therefore inherent in its design. Modification or
redesign is required to achieve a higher level.
IRAN. Inspect And Repair as Necessary.
Item . Any level of hardware assembly, e. g., part, component,
subsystem, system.
Item, Maintenance Significant . Maintenance items judged to
be the most important from a safety, reliability or
economic standpoint.
Item, Structurally Significant . Areas of primary structure
judged to be the most important from a fatigue, corro-
sion vulnerability, or failure effects standpoint.
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Maintenance . Those actions required to restore or preserve
an item in serviceable condition, including servicing,
repair, modification, overhaul, inspection, and deter-
mination of condition.
Maintenance, On-condition . A primary maintenance process
having regular, repetitive inspections or tests to
determine the condition of units, systems, or portions
of structure with regard to serviceability. The item
must affect safety and be responsive to maintenance.
Maintenance, Scheduled . That preventive or routine main-
tenance performed at defined intervals to retain an
item in a serviceable condition by systematic inspection,
detection, replacement of wearout items, adjustment,
calibration, or cleaning.
Maintenance, Unscheduled . That corrective or nonroutine
maintenance performed to restore an item to satisfactory
operating condition by correcting a known or suspected
malfunction or defect.
Malfunction . The occurrence of a condition whereby the opera-
tion of an item is outside satisfactory specified limits.
Man-hours per Flight Hour . A performance figure calculated
by dividing the direct man-hours expended to maintain
a particular group of aircraft during a given period
by the group's flying hours during that period.
NAMP . Naval Aviation Maintenance Program.
NARF. Naval Aircraft Rework Facility.
NORM . Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance. That aircraft
status indicating unavailability for mission performance
peiidxiig accomplishment c_ maintenance.
Overhaul . The restoration of an item in accordance with
instructions in the relevant manual; usually a major
disassembly of the item.
Overmaintain . The performance of maintenance actions which
during a period of relatively low probability of failure,
is not justified economically; usually too far in advance
of time-based deterioration.
Part. One piece, or two or more pieces joined together which
are not normally subject to disassembly without destruc-
tion of the designed use.
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PDLM. Periodic Depot Level Maintenance.
Plan, Maintenance . A document os *S£fc*gQ£, documents which
specifies the maintenance required to assure continued
satisfactory performance of an item or the safety of
an aircraft.
Program, Continuous Maintenance . A complete maintenance
program which will assure continuous availability of
an aircraft. The total maintenance effort is apportioned
to each of the various and more frequent types of main-
tenance. A complete overhaul is not part of a continuous
maintenance plan.
Program, Maintenance D A program which defines a logical
sequence of maintenance actions to be performed as
events or pieces of the whole which, when performed
collectively, result in achievement of desired main-
tenance standards.
Rate, Failure . That performance figure which is the quotient
of number of failures divided by total hours accumulated
during the same period. Failure rate is the reciprocal
of the mean time between failures.
Reduction in Failure Resistance . The deterioration of
inherent levels of reliability. As failure resistance
reduces, failures increase; resulting in lower reliabi-
lity. If reduction in failure resistance can be detected,
maintenance can be performed prior to the point where
reliability is adversely affected.
Redundancy . The existence of more than one means to accomplish
a given function. The alternative means need not neces-
sarily be identical. Redundancy may be active or standby.
Active redundancy connotes simultaneity whereas standby
redundancy indicates that the backup system is inopera-
tive until failure of the primary system.
Reliability . The probability that a component will perform
a required function without failure under specified con-
ditions for a specified period of time.
Reliability Analysis . The statistical assessment of the
probabilities of satisfactory performance of an item
over a specified operating span.
Removal . The deliberate detachment of a component from an
aircraft. Removals are classified into one of three
categories: scheduled, unscheduled, ;and maintenance
convenient. A scheduled removal may Ibe considered un-
justified if no delect or failure is found.
50

Removal, Unscheduled . A removal of a component brought about
as a result of a known or suspected malfunction or defect.
Removal Rate . The number of removals of an. item expressed
in terms of a base period, such as number per 1000 air-
craft flight hours.
Repair . The restoration of an item to a serviceable condition.
Repairable Part . An item which is repaired after usage rather
than discarded because it is more economical to do so.
Resources, Maintenance . Facilities, ground support equipment,
manpower, spares, consumables, and funds available to
maintain and support an aircraft in its operational
environment
.
Spares . The individual items held for the purpose of pro-
viding replacements for those removed from an aircraft
for overhaul, repair, or modification.
System . A combination of interrelated items arranged to
perform a specific function.
Time, Turnaround , That time needed to repair, service, or
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